

# AADV Instructions for Voters and Election Officials

AADV (Approve/Approve/Disapprove Voting) is a simple, directly-scored voting method. It also has a generalized form which enables it to be used both for single-winner and multiple-winner contests.

## AADV Ballot

|             | <u>Approve</u>           | <u>Disapprove</u>        |
|-------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Candidate A | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Candidate B | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Candidate C | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Candidate D | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

**AADV Instructions for Voters:** Mark an “X” in the “**Approved**” box for any one or two candidate(s) (if any) that you really like and believe would be the best one(s) to win this race. Mark an “X” in the “**Disapproved**” box for any one candidate (if any) that you strongly believe would be the worst choice and which you would not want to win this race. If you do not know enough about a candidate or do not have a strong opinion one way or the other, leave both boxes unmarked. Do not mark more than one box for any single candidate.

**AADV Instructions for Election Officials:** Disqualify any ballots which have more than two candidates marked “Approved.” Disqualify any ballots which have more than one candidate marked “Disapproved.” Disqualify any ballots which have more than one box marked for the same candidate. Total the “Approved” votes for each candidate; call this total “A.” Total the “Disapproved” votes for each candidate; call this total “D.” Add “A” and “D” for each candidate; call this sum “V.” Eliminate any candidate whose “V” is less than one plus two percent of the largest “V” of any single candidate (rounded to the nearest number of voters). Subtract “D” from “A” for each remaining candidate; call this difference “N.” Eliminate any candidate which has a zero or negative “N.” The remaining candidate (if any) that has the largest positive “N” is the winner.

**GADV (Generalized Approve/Disapprove Voting):** Generalized Approve/Disapprove Voting provides for races which have any number of winners (e.g. electing multiple school board members). When electing  $n$  winners, voters may approve up to  $n + 1$  candidates and disapprove of up to  $(n + 1)/2$  candidates (use integer division or round down). The instructions to voters and for election officials are basically the same as above except for the number of candidates voters may approve and disapprove. The winners then are simply the candidates having the top  $n$  positive net scores.

## **NOTES:**

1. User-friendly electronic voting supervision could easily prevent spoiled ballots and therefore eliminate the need to check for and disqualify these during the tally process. Software (called Election Manager) is available which can completely automate and run elections (including touch screen voting) using either the AADV or Plurality voting methods. The tally process for AADV is completely automated.
2. It is possible, though unlikely, that there could be no winner; that is, no remaining candidate with a positive "N". (Candidates with such "high negatives" would simply not be nominated, especially if AADV were used during the nominating process.) It would, of course, be easy to provide a rule to crown the "least awful" candidate the winner. But it does not seem wise to elect a candidate that more people dislike than like. Therefore, if there should be no winner, another election should be held. No candidate that received a zero or negative "N" should be allowed to run again. This is a refinement of the common practice of always having the option to vote for NOTA (None Of The Above). It is a defect of Plurality, IRV, Approval, STAR, Score and virtually all other voting methods that they are unable to sensibly handle this situation (they can easily force the election of a candidate disliked by a majority of voters).
3. Because it is at least a possibility that all candidates on the ballot could be pretty "lackluster," the winning net vote total could be fairly low. Conceivably, a write-in (or other obscure) candidate could then achieve a winning score with a very few voters. That might very well be the best outcome, but many people would find it disquieting. To keep a virtually unknown candidate from winning with a very small number of votes, it is required that a candidate must have received at least a "reasonable" amount of voter interest in order to qualify. Therefore, the total number of voters weighing in on each candidate (either for or against) is totaled to obtain "V." Any candidate is eliminated that has a "V" less than one voter plus two percent of the largest "V" of any single candidate (rounded to the nearest voter). (See the specific tally instructions for AADV for greater clarity.) Results should be displayed showing "A," "D" and "N" with the candidates in order of descending "N," followed last by any candidates disqualified for low voter interest in order of descending "V."